The Military Coup in Sudan

Accountability for Serious Human Rights and Rule of Law Violations Committed Since 25 October 2021

Briefing to the Parliament of the United Kingdom on the Designation of Targeted Sanctions against Sudanese Figures behind the October 2021 Military Coup

26 April 2022

Summary

After Sudan’s military seized power on the morning of 25 October 2021, Sudan’s optimistic, and fragile, democratic transition, which was brought through popular and peaceful protests that ousted Omar Al-Bashir nearly three years ago, had been severely delineated. Shortly after arresting and detaining several leading civilian political figures on the day of the coup, including the then-prime minister and several members of his Cabinet, the commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces and head of the Sovereign Council dissolved the government. Thereafter, a state of emergency was imposed, authorising blanket immunity to security forces, leading to an ongoing violent crackdown against protestors, women, human rights activists, journalists, and opposition leaders.

Additionally, the coup saw the suspension of key articles of the 2019 Constitutional Document, the suspension of the Eastern Track of the Juba Peace Agreement, and the exclusion of the former ruling civilian coalition in the new government. Those milestones were key developments in establishing democratic institutions, as well as the ratification of several international law treaties over the last three years. The UN Human Rights Commissioner stated that ‘the military aimed to overturn commitments to transitional justice, anti-corruption, human rights and accountability,’ whilst Chair of the UN Special Procedures Coordinating Committee, Victor Madrigal-Borloz, stated that the ‘military was showing utter contempt for democratic transition.’

Since the October coup, at least 93 pro-democracy protesters have been killed by security forces using excessive and lethal force. 1 Thousands more having been reportedly injured, and hundreds detained, tortured, and raped, including targeted attacks on medical and media facilities, and the use of persistent internet and network shutdowns, in violation of international human rights law. Additionally, the Rapid Security Forces, amongst the main perpetrators behind these abuses, have reportedly been illegally securing gold mines throughout Sudan, and smuggling hundreds of tons of gold to Russia since 2010, in return for training, weapons, equipment and political support. 2 These factors pose serious doubt as to whether the 2023 elections, under the supervision of the de facto military authorities, will take place in a free, peaceful and transparent manner, as is required under international law. 3

1 As of 07 April 2022.
Under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (‘the Sanctions Act’), the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations were made to establish a sanctions regime for the purpose of deterring, and providing accountability for activities, which if carried out by or on behalf of a State, would amount to serious violations of certain human rights by that State. The activities could be carried out by a State or non-State actor. These include activities that infringe on an individual’s right to life, freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and freedom from slavery. Additionally, the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 were made under the Sanctions Act and provide for the freezing of funds and economic resources of certain persons, entities or bodies impeding the peace process and threatening stability in the region, as well as violating relevant international law, and involved in the commission of a serious human rights violation or abuse, or a violation of international humanitarian law.

The UK Government is strongly urged to:

1. Impose targeted sanctions on those most responsible for the coup and subsequent human rights violations, including those named in this briefing;

2. Prioritize the transitional justice goals of meaningful security sector reform and law reform in any ongoing or future political consultations;

3. Emphasize the need for accountability, not to be substituted by sanctions, including by calling for the lifting of all existing blanket immunities for military, militia and security personnel.

4. Establish a working group to monitor, provide updates and formulate recommendations, in collaboration with key stakeholders, to Parliament on the progression of the democratic transition in Sudan.

Build-up to the Military Coup and the Political agreement signed on 21 November 2021

Nearly a month before presidency of the Sovereignty Council was meant to pass from former Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to a civilian figure, a meeting was held on 2 October 2021, which included a group of political parties and forces. This group splintered from the former ruling civilian coalition group, the Forces of the Freedom and Change (FFC) and is named the National Accord for the Unity of the Forces of Freedom and Change (commonly dubbed by journalists as ‘FFC-NA’ or ‘FFC 2’).

FFC-NA is formed by the Sudan Liberation Movement, led by the governor of Darfur region, Minni Minnawi, and the Justice and Equality Movement led by Minister of Finance Gebriel Ibrahim, along with other parties such as the Sudanese Ba’ath Party and the Democratic Alliance for Social Justice. In a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant-General Al-Burhan, on 4 October 2021,

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4 Provision 4(2) of the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020
6 The FCC-NA is distinguishable from the FFC Central Council which was established in November 2019 and originally selected the civilian component of the transitional government. Following its meeting with the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission Sudan (UNITAMS) in November 2021, several members of the FFC’s Central Council were detained by security forces. (https://unitams.unmissions.org/en/unitams-statement-detention-members-ffc%E2%80%99s-central-council)
7 https://www.sudaninthenews.com/political-briefings
the group demanded the dissolution of the civilian-led government and that he stop engaging with the FFC, the organisation which was part of a coalition of civil society actors that helped topple the Al-Bashir regime, and formed part of the former civilian transitional government.

Following this letter, and later the October coup, an agreement was entered into on 21 November 2021 between the military and the FFC-NA which dissolved the civilian-led transitional democracy, and Burhan was self-appointed the head of the Sovereignty Council. This was strongly rejected by the UN and Sudanese civil society, including the FFC, the Sudanese Resistance Committees and several women’s rights groups. Reports purported that the FFC-NA’s purpose of partnering with the military was to exclude the leading civilian groups calling for democratic transition; to legitimise the coup; and to evade accountability for corruption and human rights abuses by their coalition members. Additionally, the legal implications of the November 21 agreement have paved the return of the formerly ousted Islamist Party, the National Congress, which was headed by Omar Al-Bashir.⁸

This is further evidenced by documentation that the leaders of the FFC-NA formed close relations to, and held senior posts in, the former Al-Bashir regime⁹; and their calls for the dissolution of the civilian-led transitional government. Furthermore, the group attacked the ‘Committee to Dismantle the June 30, 1989 Regime and Retrieve Public Funds’ which is responsible for handing over the economic imperium of the military to democratic institutions, around which the revolution has been largely centred and enjoys popular support. In addition, the FFC-NA charter is believed to have passed through a number of groups allied with the ousted Al Bashir regime, who were required to bolster the size and credibility of the new alliance.

This alliance eventually led to the resignation of former Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok, and twelve cabinet ministers, citing an inability to appoint any ministers in the new government and that the newly signed November 21 agreement did not lead to the end of the bloodshed against protestors as agreed, leaving the army in de facto full control of the state.

Ongoing human rights abuses

Systematic patterns of human rights violations have been widely reported, including tactics employed under the previous regime, especially the arbitrary and deliberate killing of protestors; the use of rape as a tool of deterrence against female activists and demonstrators; enforced disappearances and the torture of civil society actors; and a clampdown on media freedom. As the country that has experienced the most coups on the African continent following independence from Britain,¹⁰ there is historic precedence in Sudan that the military is unwilling to cede power to a civilian-led government, nor to deter from a path of gross human rights violations and overwhelming state corruption, without enforcement and accountability mechanisms in place, particularly targeted sanctions.

The Right to life and the Use of Lethal and Excessive Force

As of 07 April 2022, security forces have killed at least 93 protestors since 25 October 2021, and have injured more than 2,000, according to the Central Committee of Sudan Doctors. Many of those killed and

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⁸ [https://twitter.com/sudaninthenews/status/1464283063987445760?s=21&t=KnXstukVQAaLFO5pQ18VjQ](https://twitter.com/sudaninthenews/status/1464283063987445760?s=21&t=KnXstukVQAaLFO5pQ18VjQ)

⁹ [https://www.sudaninthenews.com/political-briefings](https://www.sudaninthenews.com/political-briefings)

injured during demonstrations have reportedly been children. ¹¹ Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) soldiers; the Rapid Security Forces (RSF); the General Intelligence Service (GIS); the Police and Central Reserve Police; among other security actors, have figured prominently in the violent crackdown against protestors.

On 17 January, it was reported that 7 protesters were arbitrarily killed by security forces using live ammunition on peaceful demonstrations in Khartoum and other areas in Sudan, marking one of the deadliest days since the coup, exhibiting a trend of sustained disregard for human life under military rule.¹³ This includes the excessive and indiscriminate use of live ammunition against unarmed protestors, as well as prohibited weapons against civilians, including armour piercing rounds, anti-aircraft weapons and tear gas, with the UN noting that more than 25% of injuries caused were by direct hits using tear gas canisters. It is reported that security forces deliberately aimed horizontally at protestors, indicating that they were targeted intentionally in violation of international law.¹⁴ These killings can amount to crimes against humanity. Following these recent killings, 55 Sudanese judges and 100 prosecutors released separate statements condemning the use of lethal force against protesters, calling for investigations, and a lifting of the state of emergency which has offered blanket immunity and wider powers to security forces, thus emboldening impunity.¹⁵

According to reports by the UN, security forces have consistently targeted medical facilities, medical professionals, and wounded patients.¹⁶ This includes by preventing the work of the National Blood Bank; closing roads leading to critical hospitals; raiding emergency departments and searching doctors; and arresting wounded individuals while they sought medical treatment. These actions have put patients and health workers at severe risk of harm.

**Campaign of arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances**

The Sudanese coup authorities have continued a detention campaign against high-level political actors; activists; members of resistance committees; lawyers; teachers; journalists and human rights defenders. Activists reportedly monitored more than 65 detentions in Khartoum in January 2022, most of them lacking any legal procedures, particularly the detention of Resistance Committee members by the GIS.¹⁷ Detainees' whereabouts, including those of numerous former ministers, were unknown until they were released in the week of 21 November 2021, nearly a month after their detention. Additionally, members of Sudan’s Forces of Freedom and Change had reportedly been detained after meeting with the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Volker Perthes, including members Taha Osman Isahaq, Sharif Mohamed Osman and Hamza Farouk.

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¹³ [https://www.africanews.com/2022/01/17/at-least-7-protestors-killed-in-sudan-s-monday-demonstration/](https://www.africanews.com/2022/01/17/at-least-7-protestors-killed-in-sudan-s-monday-demonstration/)


Outside of Khartoum, detainees in Darfur, South Kordofan and throughout Sudan have been subjected to summary trials, or continue to be held, including in military camps, without charge under Sudan’s emergency laws.

**Freedom of Expression and Access to Information**

Since the coup, there has been a targeted clampdown on media freedom, freedom of expression, and access to information, including the arrests of journalists; home and office raids and searches; ill-treatment of media workers and suspension of licenses, as well as the use of communication and network shutdowns. It has been reported that at least 8 journalists have been abused by security forces whilst documenting protest action.\(^\text{18}\)

Furthermore, the Sudanese Journalists Network (SJN) gathered information on more than 10 harassment incidents since the military coup on October 25, including threatening phone calls to journalists working for international media networks.\(^\text{19}\)

On 16 January 2022, the broadcast license of Al Jazeera Mubasher was withdrawn and the accreditations of Al Jazeera’s journalist, Mohammed Omar, and photographer, Badawi Bashir were revoked by the Ministry of Culture and Information under the basis of ‘the un-professional coverage of the Sudanese affairs,’ and the reporting of ‘incorrect information that damages the country’s interest and social fabric.’ Authorities also intentionally cut off internet services for two weeks following the coup and have since then utilised sporadic network blackouts coinciding with popular protests. According to the SJN, this is part of the systematic crackdown on journalists who are supposed to document the ongoing crimes against Sudanese people, as well as to disrupt reporting of human rights violations and the organisation of protests by activists.

**Sexual and Gender-Based Violence**

The military coup also saw the return of rape and sexual violence used as a deliberate silencing tool by armed forces to deter female protesters partaking in demonstrations, particularly as they have been at the frontlines since the commencement of the revolution. This includes reports of the rape, or gangrape, of 13 women and girls, as well as numerous allegations of sexual harassment against women fleeing the area around the Presidential Palace, by security forces on 19 December 2021.

On the first night of the coup, military forces raided the dorms of female students at Khartoum University. These young women were beaten, verbally abused, and forced to evacuate the dorm in the middle of the night.\(^\text{20}\) More recently, on 23 January 2022, prominent women’s rights activist, Amira Osman, was abducted from her home by 15 armed, masked men wearing civilian clothes. Taken together, there have been strong patterns of violence in targeting female protesters calling for a civilian-led democratic

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\(^\text{19}\) [https://www.voanews.com/a/sudan-journalists-protest-media-crackdown-since-coup/6317029.html](https://www.voanews.com/a/sudan-journalists-protest-media-crackdown-since-coup/6317029.html)  
\(^\text{20}\) [https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/end-attacks-on-sudanese-women-protestors-and-whrds/](https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/end-attacks-on-sudanese-women-protestors-and-whrds/)
government, echoing the concern by the [UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan](https://www.un.org/peace/sudan/) (UNITAMS) as it ‘severely risks reducing [women’s] political participation in Sudan.’

**Sudan Coup leaders’ close engagement with Russia and implication in the Ukraine Crisis**

According to reports, Russia has smuggled hundreds of tonnes of illicit gold from Sudan over the last few years as part of wider efforts to build “fortress Russia” and ward against the possibility of increased Ukraine-related sanctions. An executive of one of the largest Sudanese gold companies told *The Telegraph* that the Kremlin is the largest foreign player in the country’s huge mining sector and believes that around 30 tonnes are flown to Russia each year from Sudan.

The executive added that Russia is allowed to do so because of its connections with Sudan’s warlord turned paramilitary leader, Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Daglo, who emerged from the military takeover last year as the country’s de facto vice president. Hemedti travelled to Moscow on 23 February 2022, a day before Russian troops began their invasion into Ukraine, in another sign of strengthened bilateral relations between the two regimes.²¹

Experts say that the Wagner Group, a private military company run by [Kremlin-linked oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yevgeny_Prigozhin), which was sanctioned by the UK in March 2022,²² is training Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF is the largest paramilitary organisation that sits alongside Sudan’s regular army and was formerly known as the ‘Janjaweed’ or ‘Devils on Horseback’²³ which is the main perpetrator behind the Darfur Genocide. According to the report, the two heavily armed groups have worked together to secure important gold mines for Russian mining companies in Sudan, where security is weak in remote areas and has contributed to the destabilisation of the region.²⁴


In 2020, the UK Parliament enacted *The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations* (‘the Regulations’) with the power to make sanctions regulations, deriving from section 1 of the [Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/22). The regulations allow the UK government to “put in place sanctions measures to deter, and provide accountability for, activities” that infringe on an individual’s right to life, freedom from torture, and freedom from slavery. The aim is to “deter” perpetrators from committing human rights violations, “champion human rights, good governance, and the rule of law,” whilst simultaneously preventing any humanitarian drawbacks for the wider population.

Accordingly, under the new sanction’s regime, a person may be designated only if they are clearly linked to human rights violations in one of the ways established in the legislation. These include responsibility for, engagement in, profit from, contribution to, and facilitation or concealment of an activity which violates human rights, as well as the failure to fulfil a duty to investigate such an activity. When considering designations, the Minister responsible should be ‘satisfied’ that the sanctions imposed would contribute towards the goal of deterrence or accountability for their human rights violations.

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²¹ Annex 1 further illustrates the link between Sudan’s gold mines and the Dagalo family.
²³ The Janjaweed are implicated in the ongoing ICC trial as the main perpetrator behind the genocide in Darfur.
Additionally, under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, the UK established further regulations, specifically designed to protect Sudan’s transition, with the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (‘The Act’) aimed at promoting the peace, security and stability of Sudan, encouraging the resolution of the armed conflicts in Sudan and the stabilisation of Sudan, promoting respect for democracy, the rule of law and good governance in Sudan and other related purposes.

Of the purposes of the act inter alia under Section (4)(2)(g), the IBAHRI draws particular attention to the following provisions:

Promoting respect for, and accountability in relation to violations or abuses of human rights in Sudan, including in particular, respect for—

(i) the right to life of persons in Sudan;

(iii) the right of persons not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Sudan;

(iv) the right to liberty and security of persons in Sudan, including freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or enforced disappearance;

(vi) the rights of journalists, human rights defenders, civil society activists and other persons in Sudan to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly;

Under Section 6(3) of the Act, the Secretary of State has the power to designate an involved person under Regulation 5 for ‘relevant activities’ including ‘rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, deliberate targeting of civilians, schools and hospitals; enforced or involuntary disappearances; any of the rights referred to in regulation 4(2)(g).’ Under 6(3)(f), further relevant activities include:

(f) any other action, policy or activity which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan, including acts that—

(i) undermine efforts to resolve the armed conflicts or achieve stabilisation and reconciliation,

(ii) threaten, impede or frustrate inclusive peace negotiations or transition to democratic, civilian-led government;

(iii) obstruct or undermine respect for democracy, the rule of law and good governance, or

(iv) incite violence, in Sudan.

The conditions in which such sanctions were envisioned to apply have been met in respect to ongoing human rights violations committed since the October military coup under 4(2)(g) of the Act, as well as a severe hinderance to the path of democratization, particularly in respect to the impunity afforded for the killings of protestors, the use of rape and sexual violence against women and girls, the clampdown on media freedom, and the use of torture and enforced disappearances. Further violations include not only the military coup, but the subsequent new power-sharing agreement entered into on 21 November 2020 which legitimised the military coup, and the suspension of key articles of the 2019 Constitutional Document, further risking the collapse of the Juba Peace Agreement, which directly recalls articles 6(3)(f) for the purposes of a ‘relevant activity’ in designating sanctions.
The Need for Targeted Sanctions

The UK and its allies should urgently impose targeted sanctions on Sudanese military leaders, military-owned companies, and associated entities. While not a comprehensive list, the individuals named below are senior leaders who command significant political followings, and segments of the Sudanese economy, have demonstrated themselves highly capable of actively impacting events in Sudan, and are individually responsible for serious human rights abuses. Sanctioning the named individuals and entities would make a meaningful contribution to returning Sudan to a path towards democracy.

Persons to be Designated with Targeted Sanctions

+ **Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman al-Burhan** is the public face and leader of the military takeover in Sudan. In his capacity as both the commander-in-chief of the SAF and head of the Sovereign Council, al-Burhan is responsible for the oversight of the primary organs of Sudan’s military and security apparatus, including the Ministry of Defence (overseeing the SAF), Ministry of Interior (under which sits the Sudanese police force), and the GIS.

+ **Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo** (“Hemedti”) is the commander of the RSF and deputy head of the Sovereign Council. Under Hemedti’s leadership, the RSF has played a critical role in the planning and execution of the 25 October 2021 military coup and subsequent violations. Credible human rights monitoring organisations have documented the involvement of RSF personnel in the violent suppression of protests and in the carrying out of raids and arrests, and have participated in attacks on medical facilities. Dagalo, and his brothers, are also in charge of several gold mining companies (shown below in Annex 1) which helps finance the military, especially through its ties with third countries perpetuating human rights violations, including Russia.

+ **Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo** is one of Hemedti’s brothers, and the deputy head of the RSF. In addition, he is the owner of **Al Junaid Company for Multi Activities**, a gold and construction company known to funnel money and weapons to the RSF and former al-Bashir regime.

+ **Suliman Arko Minnawi** (“Minni Minnawi”) is the leader of the SLM-MM and regional governor of Darfur. SLM-MM forces were deployed from Darfur to Khartoum in the days prior to the coup and were documented to have participated in the immediate crackdown on initial protests. Since the coup, more than 83,000 people have been displaced in Darfur, and many hundreds of others injured or killed. He is also a member of the splinter group, FFC-NA, that are to form part of the new government.

+ **Gibril Ibrahim** is the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Ibrahim is one of the only ministers to retain his position – as minister of finance – following the military takeover. In addition to acting as a public spokesperson for the military-led government, as the head of a committee established by al-Burhan to review the work of the Empowerment Removal Committee, Ibrahim has taken several consequential decisions to unfreeze the assets of companies affiliated with the National Congress Party. Ibrahim should be viewed as playing a critical role in overseeing the financial stability and longevity of the military and its assets. He is also the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) that forms part of the FFC-NA.

+ **Mubarak Ardoli** is the Director-General of the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company (SMRC) and responsible for the **procurement of public funds from the SMRC**, including large donations made to Suliman Arko Minnawi following his inauguration as Governor of Darfur, in clear violation of the State’s
Financial and Accounting Procedures Law. He is also a member on the FFC-NA as leader of the ‘Democratic Alliance for Social Justice’, and was part of the calls for the dissolution of the civilian-led transition government.

Shamseddin al-Kabbashi Ibrahim is a member of the Sovereign Council. He is believed to serve as the head of all SAF departments related to intelligence and security, and to serve as one of a handful of leaders responsible for setting the major plans for Sudan’s security forces.

Yassir Abdulrahman Hassan al-Atta is a Lieutenant General in the SAF and member of the Sovereign Council and Security and Defense Council, bodies which have authorized the ongoing state of emergency in Sudan and have taken recent steps to establish an auxiliary security force tasked with “combating terrorism”—a move which should be understood as an attempt to “legalize” the security forces’ ongoing activities.

Jamal Abdul Majid Gasim al-Sayed served as the director of the General Intelligence Service until 28 November 2021, when he was dismissed by al-Burhan. GIS personnel were among the forces implicated in violations immediately following the coup, including the arbitrary arrest and detentions of prominent political figures, activists, and journalists, as well as issuing a travel ban against 11 leading civilian members of the Committee to Dismantle the June 30, 1989 Regime and Retrieve Public Funds responsible for retrieving a number of enterprises, real estate, and assets that had been controlled by the former regime members and their associates.

Ahmed Ibrahim Mufadel is the current director of the General Intelligence Service, replacing Jamal Abdul Majid; he previously served as the deputy director. In his capacity as deputy director of GIS, Mufadel is understood to have been involved in key decision-making before and after the coup, and as current director is responsible for ongoing violations committed by GIS personnel.

Algoney Hamdan Dagalo is a second brother of Hemedti’s and a major in the RSF, where he oversees procurement activities. He is also the owner of GSK Advanced Business and Tradive General Trading LLC, two companies known to have provided critical support services to the RSF, such as vehicles and web services.

Mirghani Idris Suleiman is the head of the Defense Industrial System (DIS), a complex commercial and military entity that is responsible for manufacturing and sourcing of weapons that are primarily used by the Sudanese Armed Forces, and which generates critical financing for the SAF through other commercial ventures. DIS is under the direct control of the SAF and subordinate to the Ministry of Defense.

Sayed Tirik is Chief of Hadendowa clan of the Beja ethnic group of East Sudan and is reported to have instigated the uprising that precipitated the military coup, and is responsible for the blockade of roads from Port Sudan to Khartoum, and was also part of the calls for the dissolution of the civilian-led transitional government and for the overhaul of the eastern track of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA). One of Tirik’s demands following the blockade and the coup in joining the ruling council was for the JPA to be suspended, where a month later the JPA’s eastern track was suspended by the leader of the Rapid Support Forces, Hemedti.

Al-Tom Hajo is the deputy chair of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF), a coalition of armed movements, a member of the FFC-NA, as well as the Council of Partners, and head of the Central Track of
the JPA. He is part of several rebel groups that sided with the military component of the transitional government in the October coup, along with Mohammed Ahmed Sir al-Khatim, head of the Northern track, further jeopardising the stability of the JPA and heightening risk of armed conflict in the region.

A special thanks to investigative journalistic organisation, Sudan in the News, for its assistance in the drafting of this report.
Annex 1

Partial range of firms owned by Sudan’s military and security apparatus

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General Intelligence Service (formerly the NISS)
Many of the companies below have fallen under the control of the SAF or the RSF since April 2019

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Family of Mohammed Hamdan Daglo (Hemetti)

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GIAD (cars, machinery, furniture, cables, manufacturing)

ZAIN (telecoms)

MTN (telecoms)

Trades General Trading (based in UAE)

Al-Juneid Trading Company

Al-Juneid for Tourism

Al-Juneid for Catering

Al-Juneid for Investment

Al-Juneid for Cars and Steel

Decc-Gene Trading Companies

Al-Juneid for Mining

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