The 2024 INTERPOL Repository of Practice: the unresolved tension between facilitating police cooperation and upholding human rights

Few human rights experts and practitioners refer to INTERPOL when considering the mechanisms for the interpretation of international human rights norms. Regional bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), as well as the various United Nations committees are by far the most well-known adjudicators of human rights treaties and norms. Yet, INTERPOL, through a vast network of databases, collaboration and information sharing supporting global policing efforts, is also responsible for the daily application and interpretation of human rights principles. In reaching conclusions about which requests for police cooperation satisfy these principles, and which don’t, INTERPOL’s decisions have broad impact on the individual rights of persons around the world.

The process is initiated when member states make requests for police cooperation to INTERPOL’s Notices and Diffusions Task Force (NDTF). The NDTF, which falls under INTERPOL’s General Secretariat, issues a variety of different communications, including the infamous ‘red notice’, meant to alert law enforcement worldwide as to an individual wanted for prosecution or to serve a criminal sentence.^[3] The NDTF must decide whether the request complies with INTERPOL’s commitment to neutrality and human rights principles, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

The NDTF, however, is not a court and does not investigate the underlying facts.^[4] It merely reviews the information provided to it by the requesting state, along with limited open-source research, resulting in the issuance of hundreds, if not thousands, of potentially persecutory and unwarranted notices. Innocent people who are targeted by such notices most often become aware of them when they are arrested at an international border, denied immigration benefits and visas, or have their bank accounts frozen and closed.

A person who believes that INTERPOL’s issuance of a notice is persecutory or otherwise illegitimate may request its deletion before the CCF. Sitting in Lyon, France, the Requests Chamber of the CCF, again, is neither a court nor an investigative agency. Nevertheless, its five members must weigh evidence and arguments presented by both the requesting member state and the aggrieved individual. Filings can be long, complicated and arduous, yet there is no discovery process, no rules of evidence, no opportunity for testimony or cross-examination.^[5] Applicants for deletions of red notices must sometimes wait years for decisions,^[6] and there is no opportunity for appeal.^[7]

INTERPOL’s commitment to human rights principles and its latest guidance

At the heart of INTERPOL’s mandate are its constitutional commitments to neutrality and human rights, enshrined in Articles 2 and 3 of its constitution. Article 2 requires the organisation to operate ‘within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’^[8] Article 3 prohibits any engagement in activities of a predominantly political, military, religious or racial character.^[9] These articles, in essence, operate as ‘restrictions’ to the processing of requests for police cooperation from any member state.^[10]

Ensuring compliance with these principles has become increasingly complex due to the rise of authoritarian regimes and the growing volume of requests for police cooperation. The rise in submissions from countries with questionable human rights records, coupled with increasingly autocratic tendencies in some regions, has heightened the risk of INTERPOL’s systems being exploited for politically motivated or abusive purposes. While international human rights norms remain largely consistent, INTERPOL faces the challenge of applying such norms amid exceedingly complicated and evolving geopolitical dynamics. In its 2023 report, the CCF expressed concern about serious backlogs and limited resources to address individual requests for deletion and revision.^[11] Indeed, INTERPOL faces a herculean task, including internal and external political considerations and pressures imposed by its 196 member states, while trying to remain ever vigilant in safeguarding its mechanisms from misuse and maintaining its commitment to legitimate international police cooperation.

The latest RoP is a key instrument in this effort. Compiled by INTERPOL’s General Secretariat, the RoP serves as a critical guide for assessing whether requests for international police cooperation align with Articles 2 and 3.^[12] By offering structured criteria, it enables the General Secretariat to assess notices and diffusions against INTERPOL’s constitutional standards. These assessments involve scrutinising the greater political context of alleged offences and assessing the potential harm posed to targeted individuals, among other considerations.

The RoP’s utility extends far beyond its internal application. It is relied upon by the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files, the only body within INTERPOL that has jurisdiction to receive requests for deletion of data from private individuals. The CCF uses the RoP as a resource to evaluate compliance with Article 3, particularly in politically sensitive cases. Moreover, legal practitioners, often representing victims of INTERPOL abuse and transnational repression, leverage the RoP to substantiate claims of noncompliance, using its detailed guidance to advocate for the deletion of politically motivated or otherwise abusive and/or illegitimate notices and diffusions as part of INTERPOL’s data sharing mechanisms.

The 2024 RoP: progress and persistent challenges

Unveiled at INTERPOL’s 92nd General Assembly in Glasgow, the 2024 RoP reflects progress in at least some regards. Expanded from 48 to over 100 pages, the new edition incorporates compliance with Article 2 for the first time, providing detailed guidance on how INTERPOL should uphold individual human rights standards. Nevertheless, the 2024 RoP remains a work in progress. Persistent gaps in its operational guidance and the absence of actionable benchmarks limit its practical effectiveness in addressing the complex and evolving realities of transnational repression. Secondly, the human rights norms established by international treaties and customary international law are sometimes awkwardly balanced against the need to carry out global police work, creating confusion and allowing for requests for police cooperation that should otherwise be found non-compliant. Additionally, and perhaps the greatest practical challenge to the guidance provided by the RoP, is the reality of the CCF’s limited resources, as well as the seemingly limited commitment within INTERPOL to ensure the full application of the veritable human rights standards outlined in the RoP.

Inclusion of Article 2: framework established, practical guidance lacking

Article 2(1) of INTERPOL’s constitution obligates the organization to ‘ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’ While this provision has long guided INTERPOL’s mandate, its practical interpretation, particularly the meaning of the ‘spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, has been a persistent question for practitioners.^[13] The 2024 RoP offers a response by clarifying that INTERPOL interprets this constitutional mandate as one requiring it to safeguard individual rights (in contrast to Article 3, which is about protecting and ensuring INTERPOL’s neutrality mandate).

The RoP emphasises that INTERPOL’s activities must balance the goals of enforcement of criminal law with the protection of fundamental human rights, guided by the principles of dignity, equality and justice.^[14] Requests processed through INTERPOL’s channels must align with international human rights standards, as reflected in treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the jurisprudence of regional human rights courts, including for example, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.^[15] By directly referencing these treaties and courts as authoritative sources, the RoP seeks to further root INTERPOL’s operations in more well-established international norms. Again, the noble goal being to avoid the publication of requests for police cooperation that violate individual human rights.

To ensure compliance with Article 2, the RoP outlines an evaluation process that includes examining the requesting state’s human rights record, judicial independence, patterns of politically motivated prosecutions and the risk of harm to the targeted individual. It underscores the importance of external findings, such as decisions and reports from international human rights bodies and regional courts, as tools to assess whether violations of international human rights norms have occurred. Again, this reference to other venues’ interpretation and application of human rights norms is a necessity originating from INTERPOL’s principal mandate, which is police cooperation and not adjudicating human rights claims. Nevertheless, while the updated RoP allows for increased transparency regarding the application of Article 2, it falls short in providing practical, scenario-based examples that could guide consistent application in complex cases.

Unlike the Article 3 framework, which includes detailed examples of compliant and non-compliant cases involving politically sensitive charges, Article 2 compliance remains largely theoretical. While the RoP identifies risks such as due process violations, exposure to torture and unfair trials, it leaves a lot of room for interpretation, as well as for potentially allowing non-compliant requests for cooperation. For example, the RoP notes that an authoritative finding by an international court that a confession was extracted by torture would likely not allow for the processing of data. ‘On the other hand, an excessive pre-trial detention, though regrettable and constituting a human rights violation, might not undermine the compliance of data.’^[16] In such a situation, according to the RoP, questions about compliance could be resolved according to whether or not the state properly addressed the violation, for instance by abiding by a court judgment.^[17] This language raises several questions and poses concerns for persecuted individuals.

Firstly, why are some human rights violations treated as more acceptable than others? A violation of any international norm should at the very least raise significant concerns about compliance. Both the ICCPR and the European Convention on Human Rights protect the right of detained individuals to a trial within a reasonable time or to be released pending trial.^[18]

Secondly, the RoP seems to apply standards that are impractical for many illegitimate targets of requests for cooperation. Most individuals have neither the time, resources nor the access to independent human rights courts to obtain conclusive judgments on human rights violations before they challenge a request for police cooperation. At the very least the RoP should have recognised that in cases where the target of the request for cooperation is of limited means, a member of a particularly vulnerable group, or where the request comes from a state where security concerns make it difficult, if not impossible, to find redress in national or international courts, a formal finding from an international court may not always be possible, allowing for the admission of other evidence.

Thirdly, any member state’s response that it has addressed a violation could mask additional due process concerns and human rights violations. For example, a state may respond that a court has resolved the human rights complaint in favour of the government. But what if that court is also compromised or somehow biased against the individual who filed the complaint? What if, again, the individual involved is a member of a particularly vulnerable group, such as journalist or politician? This type of scenario is increasingly common in many cases involving a request for deletion of politically motivated red notices.

To meaningfully act ‘within the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,’ INTERPOL should also provide more guidance on alternative evidence of human rights violations. For example, many targets of red notices may find it impracticable to obtain a decision from an international court, but they may be able to procure reputable legal experts, who can assertively opine on due process or human rights violations. Evidence of persecution may and often does come in the form of statements from private individuals, who are aware of relevant facts that may raise significant due process concerns. It would have been helpful for the RoP to provide guidance as to when statements from individuals or legal opinions from objective third parties may be considered, what weight is given to sworn declarations provided by targets of cooperation and how applicants can prove their victimisation when they do not have access to courts. Instead, practitioners and INTERPOL officials are left to speculate about critical thresholds for non-compliance, such as the type and level of evidence required to substantiate claims of judicial bias or systemic rights violations.

This lack of operational clarity is particularly problematic given the high stakes in terms of human rights assessments under Article 2. For example, when a request originates from a state with a documented pattern of systemic judicial corruption, it remains unclear how INTERPOL should balance the absence of direct evidence in an individual case against broader, well-established patterns of abuse. Similarly, procedural shortcomings, such as a lack of notification or denial of legal counsel, are not clearly addressed in the RoP, leaving practitioners uncertain as to whether such deficiencies are enough to outright reject a request for police cooperation through INTERPOL’s systems.

The absence of practical examples in the RoP represents a missed opportunity to address these challenges. Real-world scenarios illustrating the application of Article 2 principles could provide much-needed clarity, equipping practitioners and INTERPOL officials with better tools to assess complex cases.

By codifying the principles underpinning human rights assessments, INTERPOL has reaffirmed its commitment to neutrality and fairness in international policing. However, the RoP’s effectiveness in combating transnational repression will ultimately depend on its ability to bridge the gap between principle and practice. Future updates must prioritise the development of practical, scenario-based guidance to ensure consistent application and empower practitioners to effectively challenge abusive requests with the tools that they have available to them.

Article 3 guidance in the 2024 RoP: a focus on clear violations over complex realities

The 2024 RoP introduces expanded guidance for the application of Article 3 of INTERPOL’s constitution, refining the framework for addressing neutrality in politically sensitive cases. One of the notable advancements in the 2024 RoP is its enhanced guidance on cases involving political figures, state security offences and civil unrest.^[19] By providing practical examples, it delineates how INTERPOL assesses the legitimacy of charges against individuals accused of participating in political protests or opposition movements. For example, it distinguishes cases where evidence substantiates genuine criminal acts, such as violence, from those where charges are used as a pretext to suppress dissent.^[20] These distinctions are essential in order to safeguard INTERPOL’s systems from being weaponised for political retaliation purposes.

The RoP also addresses terrorism-related allegations, an area fraught with political sensitivities.^[21] It provides criteria to evaluate requests based on the international recognition of a designated terrorist organisation. Specifically, the RoP clarifies how INTERPOL should approach requests tied to groups that are recognised as terrorist entities only by the requesting state, underscoring the necessity of robust evidence linking the accused to ordinary law crimes that are independent of political or ideological affiliations.^[22] This refinement is critical in mitigating the misuse of counterterrorism frameworks to suppress legitimate political opposition.

While these provisions are certainly helpful, the guidance remains predominantly centred on clear-cut violations, often involving government officials or political dissidents, leaving a significant gap in addressing more complex and nuanced realities of transnational repression.

We addressed this topic and how cross-border persecution affects victims of many different backgrounds in our recent testimony before the United States’ Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the US Helsinki Commission).^[23] We noted:

‘Politically motivated INTERPOL abuse does not only occur when the targets of Red Notices are politicians, dissidents, or journalists. Those are the obvious cases. States also engage in INTERPOL abuse in relation to ordinary citizens who are either the victims of corruption or because they have challenged government action in some way, including through arbitration proceedings. In many of these cases, the criminal allegations contained in the Red Notice are not overtly political. They appear to be ordinary law crimes, and often financial crimes. Neither the NDTF nor U.S. agencies have the information to identify these cooperation requests as politically motivated. As a result, lives are ruined, visas are revoked, rights are abrogated, and asylum is delayed, and sometimes denied.’^[24]

INTERPOL’s recognition of how autocratic abuse of INTERPOL may play out in these ‘non-traditional’ cases would go far in helping protect and clarify Article 3’s mandate in today’s reality.

One highly complex and systematic area of abuse, where the RoP’s advancements are less helpful is in financial crimes cases, which have emerged as a tool frequently used by authoritarian regimes to target business figures, dissidents or political opponents.^[25] Allegations of fraud, embezzlement or corruption are often weaponised in politically charged contexts, such as arbitration disputes or regime changes, to neutralise perceived threats or rivals. Despite acknowledging the potential for misuse,^[26] the RoP fails to provide sufficient criteria to assess when such charges are pretextual. This oversight leaves a critical gap in addressing one of the fastest-growing categories of politically sensitive cases.

Additionally, financial crime allegations frequently arise in complex political or economic contexts, such as investment disputes or situations involving state-controlled entities. Despite these complexities, the RoP provides minimal guidance on evaluating contextual factors, such as geopolitical tensions, patterns of targeting opposition figures, corruption or state-led economic interests. The lack of explicit direction in these areas hampers practitioners and INTERPOL officials tasked with assessing such cases.

Conclusion

The 2024 RoP is a commendable step forward in refining INTERPOL’s approach to neutrality and individual human rights. However, its predominant focus on straightforward scenarios limits its utility in addressing the nuanced and practical realities of persecutory or illegitimate requests for cooperation. The RoP also highlights the inherent tension between INTERPOL’s primary role as an organisation that seeks to promote police cooperation, while also seeking to defend individuals from human rights abuses, without actually having the resources or structure needed to accomplish both.

To strengthen INTERPOL’s resilience against abusive notices, future revisions of the RoP must prioritise greater specificity in regard to assessing financial crimes, provide clearer criteria for weighing contextual factors and allow for the introduction of alternative sources of evidence. Perhaps most critically, INTERPOL, through its RoP, should provide concrete and practical examples of compliant and non-compliant cases involving ‘non-traditional’ victims of abuse, including businesspersons and ordinary citizens who have fallen out of favour with their governments and/or are victims of corruption. Equally important, INTERPOL must dedicate the resources and political will to ensure that the NDTF and the CCF can adequately safeguard individual human rights, a goal that is equally as important as INTERPOL’s neutrality mandate. Without these changes, the RoP risks being incomplete and aspirational rather than a robust tool for protecting human rights.

Notes