Assessing the Abraham Accords

Emad Mekay, IBA Middle East CorrespondentThursday 4 February 2021

A wave of agreements between Arab countries and Israel was brokered by the Trump administration. Global Insight assesses their chances of success.

Header pic: ‘Peace’ is projected in Arabic, English and Hebrew on the municipality building as UAE and Bahrain sign agreements regarding relations with Israel at a White House ceremony, Tel Aviv, Israel, 15 September 2020. REUTERS/Nir Elias

A series of ‘normalisation’ deals between Arab governments and Israel have been hailed as a leap forward in the often-turbulent Middle East. But two significant groups have been sidelined: the Palestinians and Arab public sentiment. This could turn these new accords into another phase of cold peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours, according to observers.

Michael Robbins is the Director of the Arab Barometer, a research network based at Princeton and the University of Michigan. ‘Without a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the effects of normalization are likely to be a cold peace at best’, he says.

Robbins, who has been conducting surveys across the Middle East and North Africa for years, pointed to decades of formal normalisation between Egypt and Jordan with Israel, full of the same mistakes and low public support. ‘The populations of Egypt and Jordan, who signed peace treaties with Israel in 1979 and 1994 respectively, continue to have deep reservations about Israel and continue to think of Israel as a significant security threat’, Robbins says.

Trump’s wave before departing

The wave of recent agreements included four deals, brokered primarily by the Trump administration before departing the White House. They were dubbed the Abraham Accords, a reference to Abraham whom both the Arabs and the Israelis consider as the father of ancient Arab and Hebrew tribes.

Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates signed the agreements – none of which have had a direct military conflict with Israel. Two other Gulf states – Oman and Saudi Arabia – are widely expected to make similar moves after previously objecting to relations with Israel for its occupation of Arab land. And, until the deals signed late in 2020, many remained technically at war with Tel Aviv.

While Saudi Arabia has not yet signed a deal with Israel, it is helping prepare its citizens and the Arab world for that possibility. In fact, many observers say the other recently signed deals were at the behest of Riyadh.

The Emiratis and Saudis, who control massive media empires, gave space and funding to voices criticising the Palestinians and blaming the people of the region for underachievement and praising Israel. Saudi soap operas watched by millions slipped scenes arguing in favour of normal relations with Israel.

In April, four months before the first normalisation accord was signed, Saudi show ‘Exit 7’, produced and written by Nasser al-Qasabi, tested the water. ‘How could you trade with the Israelis? We tell our kids that they are enemy’, Qasabi told another character in the show. ‘The Israelis are not our enemies’, the other character responded. ‘The enemies are the ones we supported for long and then now show no appreciation back. They bad-mouth us more than the Israelis do’, the character implored in reference to the Palestinians.

Newspapers ran columns peddling the common ancestry with Israel. Early in October the pan-Arab Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya TV station ran a lengthy interview with former head of the Saudi Intelligence, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, that many Arab columnists described as an anti-Palestinian tirade. The Palestinians, he said, have been ‘failures’ for 70 years. ‘I believe that we in Saudi Arabia, acting on our goodwill, have always been there for them. Whenever they asked for advice and help, we would provide them with both without expecting anything in return, but they would take the help and ignore the advice. Then they would fail and turn back to us again, and we would support them again, regardless of their mistakes’, said Prince Bandar.

The Saudis used other tools at their disposal to ease the departure from their former policy. Religious leaders of the Saudi Wahhabi interpretation of Islam publicly said a move towards normalisation would be in the right direction.

There were numerous reports of Saudi officials meeting secretly with top Israeli officials. In November, Israeli media reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the new, futuristic Saudi desert city of Neom. The Saudis denied the report.

After years of secrecy

Saudi Arabia’s closest regional ally, the UAE, was the first to go public with a deal with Israel. The two countries formalised relations in September 2020 after years of secret coordination behind the scenes to contain Iran, a rival for both countries.

The Emiratis celebrated the deal with great fanfare that was partly designed to encourage other countries to follow suit. Israeli models were invited to the UAE where they advertised pyjamas against a background of desert and respective national flags in a video shoot. Israeli couples could hold wedding ceremonies in Dubai’s skyscrapers while Emirati officials in traditional garb lit menorahs. The Emiratis also bought an Israeli football team and signed a cinema co-production deal to produce films to encourage ‘tolerance and coexistence’.

But a more substantial cornerstone of the UAE foreign policy, with Saudi agreement, is to undermine Iran and, domestically, pre-empt any political change in the region. Two goals shared by Israel.

Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all backed the 2013 military coup in Egypt which toppled conservative Islamist president Mohamed Morsi. Israel, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, sees political Islamists as a long-term security threat.

The three countries hold broadly similar views on Iran. The UAE knows that despite its vast financial wealth, it’s no match for Iranian military power should a war break out in the region. Both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh were rattled by the vast advances in military technology around them, particularly the radar-evading missiles that attacked a Saudi oil facility in 2019.

The two countries see Israeli military might as another layer of protection against Iran. Israeli companies have also been helping Saudi Arabia and the UAE with electronic espionage as well. The technology won much praise in those countries after succeeding in tracking down several dissidents.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also drawn to Israel due to another newly perceived threat: Turkey, a country whose sophisticated drones froze the UAE’s plans to force power in Libya into the hands of the Libyan National Army Field Marshal, Khalifa Haftar, their favourite strongman.

Quid pro quo

In return for economic normalisation and business deals, a major gain for the Emiratis will be obtaining advanced Israeli military and espionage technology. The UAE and Saudis have shown interest in Israeli electronic missile defence systems. The United States says it will sell the UAE advanced F-35 fighter jets too, despite initial Israeli objections. Israel has also agreed to temporarily suspend a plan to annex parts of the occupied Palestinian West Bank.

Immediately after the UAE move, the small kingdom of Bahrain, with only 1.4 million people, jumped on the bandwagon and formalised relations with Israel in line with the Saudi-UAE bloc. It was Saudi military intervention in 2011 that saved the government from collapse during the initial phase of the Arab Spring, as protestors took to the streets against the rule of King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. Bahrain’s Sunni government also views Iran as an existential threat because of its influence within the country’s majority Shiite population.

Sudan, where in the 1960s Arab leaders declared several ‘noes’ to normalisation with Israel and pledged economic boycott, came next. The head of the ruling military, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, had quietly met Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Uganda in February last year. After his return, Sudanese media, mostly controlled by the state, aired segments suggesting the only way to get Sudan off the US’s State Sponsors of Terrorism list was by formalising diplomatic relations with Israel and allowing Israeli air flights over Sudan to Africa.

The new secular government in Sudan, which took office after toppling the long-serving former president Omar al-Bashir and his conservative government, promised the Sudanese that the normalisation will bring immediate benefits. Bashir was toppled after several months of street protests against food shortages. Sudan’s capital Khartoum saw no public opposition to its decision.

The US, the deal’s sponsor, pledged $1.2bn in aid, alongside cheap loans guaranteed by the US government for Sudan’s infrastructure development. ‘That will create positive opportunities for Sudan in unlocking significant amounts of funds both at the World Bank, the IMF and at the United States’, said the then US Secretary of Treasury Steven Mnuchin. In December, Washington lifted Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. Sudan, a country of 40 million people, promised to promote tolerance and cultural normalisation with Israel.

Sworn enemy no more

On 10 December 2020, another sworn enemy of Israel made its turnaround. Morocco became the latest country to initiate the normalisation of relations with Israel following the example of the previous three states.

Here too, the agreement was sweetened with arms deals. But Rabat’s biggest win was Washington’s acknowledgement of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, a sparsely populated territory of 252,120 sq km whose status remains undecided. Western Saharan leaders, who want their own state, responded that a deal with Israel won’t determine their fate and the United Nations and international law would define the future of the disputed region.

Morocco’s move was ironic in many ways. King Mohammed VI, who has the title Emir of Believers, actually heads the Al-Quds Committee, a committee set up to defend Al-Quds, the Arab name for Jerusalem, but the deal makes no reference to the Palestinians.

Morocco-based lawyer and IBA officer of the Arab Regional Forum Nesrine Roudane said the normalisation deals were ‘major developments for the region.’ Morocco stood to benefit greatly, she says. ‘For Morocco, the situation is different than that of Israel's more immediate neighbors, as the two countries have long-standing, historical ties due mainly to the large number of Israelis of Moroccan origin and substantial, albeit indirect, Israeli investments in the country, which can now be made directly’, she explained. ‘Morocco's signature of bilateral agreements with Israel were also important in the context of securing US recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over the Moroccan Sahara and the signature of a major arms deal.’

David Paterson is Chair of the IBA’s Indigenous Peoples Committee. He says the deals complicate the situation for at least one group of people in the region. ‘For Morocco, [the deal] appears to have been to obtain American support for its illegal occupation of the lands of Western Sahara’, he told Global Insight. ‘The indigenous peoples of Western Sahara may well be directly impacted by the agreement with Morocco.’

Paterson pointed out that in 1975 the International Court of Justice issued an Advisory Opinion supporting the right of the peoples of Western Sahara to self-determination. ‘Now, 45 years later, these lands are still occupied by Morocco, now with the support of the United States’, he said.

Unlike the uproar that followed Egypt’s signing of a peace agreement with Israel in 1979, Arab reaction has been generally subdued. This, in part, reflects the irrelevance of some of those Arab governments to the life of Palestinians under Israeli occupation. Unlike Egypt or Syria, all four Arab governments never actually went to war with Israel. Saudi Arabia in the past imposed an oil embargo on the US for helping Israel during the 1973 war but never had direct combat with Israel.

The only regional power that criticised the deal was Iran. Tehran views Arab rapprochement with Israel not only as a betrayal of the Palestinians and Islamic holy sites, but as a potential threat to its own national security. After all, Bahrain and the UAE may give the Israelis a foothold in the Gulf. Several Iranian officials described the deals as ‘a betrayal of the Islamic world’.

Ignoring the Palestinians

The Palestinians and their two branches – the secular wing, as represented by the Fatah party led by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and the Islamist wing represented by the Hamas organisation which controls Gaza – condemned the normalisation march and issued statements asserting their right to return to their land. The two factions were later split again over the issue when Fatah, which receives largesse from the Arab Gulf countries, toned down its rhetoric. Hamas, on the other hand, which gets Iranian support, remained steadfast in criticising the deals. Many ordinary Palestinians expressed sentiment that they are being left behind.

‘These [agreements] seem to have little to do with the Palestinians who do not appear to have been involved in the process’, says Paterson. ‘This would appear to be another chapter of big-nation politics whose purpose is to consolidate an alliance against Iran. For some countries, a motive appears to have been access to military arms.’

‘It is not clear that the Palestinians have been directly impacted by any of these agreements, though they do indicate a weakening of international support for their cause’, he says.

Roudane said the Palestinians were not completely absent. ‘The Accords have already led to multiple bilateral arrangements and the suspension of Israel's plans to annex the Jordan Valley and the West Bank Settlements. The Palestinians' right to self-determination remains an open issue, which the Accords didn't aim at resolving’, she says.

Court of public opinion

Another segment in the Middle East sidelined in the deals are the people of the region who still view Israel as an occupation force backed by Western powers. They give little or no credence to Israel’s claims to the land.

Egypt’s 40-year deal with Israel remains unpopular. For many years, Israel complained of a ‘cold peace’ with the Egyptians and, to date and despite pressure from the government, many trade unions would disbar members for taking parts in activities with Israelis.

Arab Barometer surveys from the past 15 years found that Arab publics consistently opposed closer ties with Israel. ‘Arab publics remain strongly supportive of the Palestinian cause, meaning that without a viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the vast majority are unlikely to support their countries making peace with Israel’, said Robbins.

‘Sympathy for the Palestinian cause remains very strong across MENA [the Middle East and North Africa] and it is difficult to imagine the views of ordinary citizens changing without a shift in Israeli policy toward the Palestinians.’

In its latest studies on the topic, Arab Barometer surveyed people in Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia on their attitudes toward the latest normalisation deals with Israel. The survey found that fewer than ten per cent said they favour or strongly favour the Abraham Accords in all countries, except Lebanon.

Even on the issue of Iran, people of the region still consider Israel as a greater threat. ‘Although Iran is viewed as a major threat by governments across the region, Arab citizens are far more likely to say Israel represents the biggest security threat to their country relative to Iran’, Robbins explains. ‘In effect, the views of ordinary citizens vary from their leaders and the perceived threat of Iran is insufficient to overcome long-held concerns about Israel. As a result, support for the peace treaties remains low.’

Roudane, however, says the reaction against the deal was already waning and didn’t appear to carry much influence; she predicts more deals with Israel. ‘Initial public criticism, which was to be expected from the politically active pro-Palestinian segment of the population, has already largely died down’, she told Global Insight. ‘Public criticism is to be expected and may curb political enthusiasm of other regional seats of influence and allies – Jordan and Egypt, mainly – and slow the process of normalisation with others like Saudi Arabia, but will not, in my opinion, have a significant long-term impact on deals reached to date. Many more deals between Israel and Arab countries are to be expected in the coming months and years.’

Robbins of the Arab Barometer said public opinion in the region matters, more than what Arab regimes would like to admit, but agreed with Roudane that it will not have long-term impact against the Abraham Accords. This means that countries like Saudi Arabia trying to gauge reaction will likely move ahead with a possible deal.

‘As the uprisings of 2011 and the protests of 2019 demonstrated, regardless of regime type, public opinion does matter. However, it is also clear that citizens are far more concerned about domestic concerns than international politics. When we ask citizens about the biggest problem facing their country, the dominant issues are the economy, corruption, quality of public services and now Covid-19. Only a small percentage name Israel. It’s unlikely that such deals will lead to dramatic events such as mass uprisings across the region’, Robbins says.

He notes that despite public opinion in Morocco, Rabat appears to have won the most from the wave of deals and therefore eased internal opposition. ‘Even as Moroccans remain sympathetic toward Palestinian cause, the domestic benefits of increased legitimacy for the country’s claim over Western Sahara is likely to outweigh the costs in the eyes of many citizens’, Robbins says. ‘If other leaders can exact similar domestic benefits in exchange for their recognition of Israel, it is likely that their publics will be more accepting or at least understanding of the logic of these treaties. However, if not, then the treaties will probably increase the divide between governments and those they govern.’

International law versus politics

But, even with the view that Arab or Palestinian opinion is of little influence, the Palestinian issue remains unsolved and will hang over any future agreements. Paterson says international law may and can play a role but will remain a subsidiary to politics. ‘Ultimately the Palestinian question is more one of politics than law to the extent a solution is sought’, he says. ‘This is not to say there are not legal principles to be considered, just that these principles are unlikely to be determinative other than in the court of world opinion.’

Enforcement of rights of Palestinians still effectively requires the agreement of Israel to respect those rights, he argued. ‘At the end of the day, we don’t have a world government which can adjudicate matters such as these and impose a resolution. This particular conflict long precedes the creation of the state of Israel. Any viable solution will be voluntary. Unfortunately, as in most matters of these types, the ultimate test tends to be whether the cost of settling a problem is greater than the cost of leaving it unresolved. International lawyers and courts may speak to the rights of peoples to self-determination, but, as Stalin noted of the Pope, they have no “divisions” with which to enforce these.’

Emad Mekay is the IBA’s Middle East Correspondent. He can be contacted at emad.mekay@int-bar.org

For more on this subject, watch a recording of The Abraham Accords: the genesis of a new economic chapter? at the IBA 2020 - Virtually Together Conference.