A statue depicting the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, father of Bashar al-Assad, is seen destroyed on the top of a mount in Dayr Atiyah, Syria, Sunday 5 January 2025. AP Photo/Leo Correa

As Syria enters a new chapter following the fall of Bashar al-Assad, its transitional leaders are wrestling with the deep wreckage of war: a devastated economy, fractured society and mounting demands for justice. The country stands at the precarious crossroads of retribution and reconciliation.

In a country long governed by fear and impunity, Syria’s judiciary is now facing an extraordinary reckoning. Eighty-seven judges are under investigation for overseeing the country’s notorious ‘terrorism courts’. Those are tribunals that, until recently, could condemn dissidents to property confiscation, imprisonment or execution with little more than a scribbled signature.

The investigations mark one of the clearest ruptures from Syria’s brutal past under the ousted dictator Bashar al-Assad, an indication that the Arab Spring and the country’s long, drawn out, 14-year uprising, once dismissed as a lost cause, has finally seized the upper hand. For victims of the al-Assad regime’s brutality, the news carries the weight of justice delayed but not yet denied. The victory of the country's uprising brings new battles for the new rulers: stabilising a shattered state, fending off foreign meddling and delivering justice to victims of a regime that killed hundreds of thousands of its own citizens.

The young spark

The roots of the regime’s collapse can be traced back to 2011 and a handful of teenagers in the southern city of Daraa. Inspired by mesmerising TV coverage of the long-time dictators in Tunisia and Egypt being toppled during the early stages of the Arab Spring, they scrawled a defiant message to their own entrenched ruler: ‘Your turn has come, O Doctor’. The taunt was aimed at Bashar al-Assad, the ophthalmologist-turned-autocrat whose eventual downfall would come after 14 years of copious blood and sweat.

The ruling regime’s response was shockingly vicious. Forces arrested and tortured children, raped women and seized property. They unleashed sarin nerve gas, dropped barrel bombs and buried executed civilians in mass graves. Protesters, once unarmed, soon formed militias to defend their neighbourhoods.

Assad, inheriting power in 2000 from his ruthless father, Hafez, clung to rule by courting Shiite Alawite elites and inviting in foreign forces. First Iran, then Russia. Backed by these foreign powers, he outlasted other Arab strongmen facing similar uprisings. Yet, the strategy plunged Syria into a costly global proxy war. The country fractured further as Turkey, the US and Gulf states armed rival rebels. Assad’s tactics initially appeared to secure his survival. As recently as 2023, Assad was being diplomatically rehabilitated, in the region and internationally.

Then Assad’s protectors faltered. Russia was bogged down in Ukraine. Iran was consumed by regional conflicts. The world’s attention was drawn to Israel and Palestine. The Syrian opposition saw an opening. A coalition led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an armed group that controlled the northern city of Idlib, launched a lightning offensive in December 2024, storming regime cities, which culminated in Damascus after just 11 days.

The dictator fled to Russia under cover of night. Hollowed out by corruption and attrition, his ragtag army collapsed behind him like a sandcastle. His departure marked the end of a 24-year rule. ‘Syria under Assad had become a broken down car without an engine. Very few are going to fight to keep it afloat,’ says David Lesch, author of Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad.

Regional tremors

Across the Arab world, like-minded leaders watched Syria’s gradual change and its final chapter with trepidation. After all, their own nations are still simmering with the same tensions that had ignited the Arab Spring in 2011, a combustible combination of corruption, economic despair and an iron-fisted ruling class that despises their own people.

In Egypt, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who rose to power in 2013 in a blood drenched coup, scrambled to distance himself from Assad’s legacy. In a rare meeting with state-aligned media, a visibly tense Sisi, who made cracking down on Islamists a hallmark policy, insisted he had ‘no blood on his hands’. Since then, pro-Sisi outlets and social media accounts have echoed a single warning: that Syria is a bad model and that if the country falls into chaos, extremists will take over.

The Arab Gulf’s oil-rich monarchies, with their deep influence stretching across the region, initially offered cautious support but quickly warmed to the new regime. Qatar signalled its readiness to help, while Saudi Arabia cheered the shift even though a few months earlier Riyadh was leading the charge to reintegrate Assad into the region – pushing to readmit him to the Arab League. For Riyadh, Assad’s unexpected fall was a welcome blow to Iran.

Russia was bruised too. Its bases on the Syrian coast had been the bedrock of Assad's survival, but Moscow had to renegotiate its military foothold with a new Damascus regime likely to drive a harder bargain.

Then there’s Turkey, the northern neighbour emerging as an unlikely winner. Though Syrian rebels deny it, whispers persist that Ankara greenlit their decisive December 2024 advance to finish off Assad. Turkish diplomats – the Foreign Minister and Spy Chief among them – were the first foreign officials to sweep into Damascus, spotted riding in a car with Syria’s new president, 42-year-old Ahmed al-Sharaa. Now, Turkey is poised to wield its influence, possibly pressing the fledgling government to pacify anti-Ankara Kurdish factions, fighters long backed by the US from the Al-Tanf base, where the US still has 2,000 troops in northeastern Syria.

The gathering storm

No neighbour reacted more dramatically than Israel. Even as rebel forces severed Iran’s supply lines to its Shiite proxy, Hezbollah and disbanded Iran-aligned militias – disrupting Tehran’s anti-Israel axis – Israel still saw the success of the Syrian revolution as a gathering storm on its doorstep. HTS, now the main power broker in Syria, had its roots in Al-Qaeda and was, until 7 July, still listed as a terrorist group by the US. Israel immediately unleashed dozens of airstrikes inside Syria, pounded military installations, barred farmers from their fields along the southern frontier and expanded its occupation of the Golan Heights that it initially seized in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Then it went further, proclaiming itself the guardian of Syria’s Druze minority, some of whom have resisted attempts by the new Syrian regime to extend power to their towns and villages.

The new president, al-Sharaa, who is actively rebranding as a suited political actor rather than a rebel fighter in traditional garb, pledged to uphold the 1974 disengagement agreement and steer clear of regional confrontations – a reference to Israel. That didn't placate Tel Aviv. Israel's Deputy Foreign Minister immediately dismissed him as ‘a wolf in sheep's clothing’, exposing Israel's compulsive scepticism of all things Islamist. And Israel’s Defence Minister said his troops will remain in the land it took from Syria indefinitely.

‘Israel is creating monsters where none exist,’ says Rob Geist Pinfold, lecturer in International Security at King's College London. ‘There was at least justification for some military action against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. In Syria, Israel has no such casus belli.’

Wheat and fuel

Israel’s hardline policy towards the new Syria has further complicated another major challenge facing the interim authorities – the country’s war-battered economy. Israel has been lobbying the US to maintain Syria’s pariah status, pushing to keep the terrorist label on HTS and preserve the stifling international sanctions under which the country has become so poor that Saudi Arabia and Qatar paid Syria’s World Bank debt of $15m.

At the end of last year, the Central Bank of Syria announced foreign reserves of just $200m – a significant drop from the $17bn reported by the International Monetary Fund in 2010, prior to the eruption of civil war. Local banks limit daily withdrawal allowances to $20. Unemployment affects one in four adults. The country suffers shortages in fuel and wheat and is struggling to pay government workers.

Israel says it’s protecting its national security by limiting Syria's economic rebound. Analysts say Israel is walking a fine line. Thwarting Syria’s fragile transition risks backfiring. ‘Unless Israel reigns in its actions and sanctions against Syria aren't relieved, there is a risk of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory,’ says Pinfold. ‘Iran and Russia are still active in Syria and have not gone away. This is a once-in-a-generation chance to make Syria a better place to live and to flip the country away from regional revisionism. It should not be missed.’

But, following pressure from Turkey and lucrative deals worth billions of dollars from Saudi Arabia, the Trump administration announced it would lift sanctions on Syria in May, culminating in a full termination of the Syria sanctions programme by executive order on 30 June 2025. The EU pledged €175m for recovery. Washington is reportedly trying to link Syria's economic reintegration with a broader settlement deal between Israel and the new Syrian government culminating in an unprecedented meeting between Syria's new foreign minister and Israeli officials.

Hands of peace

Such external crises are only part of the battle ahead for the new Syria. The new administration faces a shattered nation internally. Al-Sharaa, trying to assert new sovereignty, is working towards reconciliation. The country's first parliamentary elections under its new leadership were scheduled for mid-September. Al-Sharaa has repeatedly brandished his previous unifying leadership experience when he ruled the northern city of Idlib.

But scaling those efforts to the rest of Syria is a major challenge. ‘They have shown pragmatism before, but the context now is different,’ says Nanar Hawach, Senior Analyst for Syria at the International Crisis Group. ‘In Idlib, the HTS ruled a largely homogenous population. Now, they face a far more diverse country and how far their pragmatism can stretch is still unclear.’

There are indications that this will indeed be an uphill task. In March, al-Sharaa took a major step towards national reconciliation. He signed a tentative agreement with the commander of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – a rival faction that fears Arab majority rule – to integrate the group into the reconstituted Syrian army.

A couple of weeks later, he swore in a new 23-member transitional cabinet that included some members of minorities in ministerial positions but kept top posts to his coalition. ‘Given how diverse Syria's population is, the regime needs the confidence of the country's various groups and factions in order to govern effectively’, says Betcy Jose, a professor at the University of Colorado Denver specialising in armed conflict and international humanitarian law.

But al-Sharaa’s efforts at reconciliation suffered a major setback. In the Alawite heartland, Assad loyalists ambushed coalition forces, hitting hospitals and security posts. The backlash was swift and bloody, with civilians caught in the crossfire. Unofficial militias joined the fray, blurring justice and revenge. Though an investigation has begun, the damage lingers. Now, Alawites say they fear similar reprisals while the new government’s grip has been proven to be shaky.

Worse, several militias that were formed during the war have so far resisted joining the newly formed national army, in part because the new authorities may not be able to pay their salaries. Several armed groups remain outside the control of the new state.

‘As long as the central government remains weak like this, it will not be able to confront outside forces looking to stake strategic claims in Syria or cause problems for the new regime in power,’ says Lesch.

Trail of anguish

Syria’s new rulers face other pressing issues, particularly the hopes of victims of the previous brutal regime for swift justice. Alongside a wish for a better life, Syrians are demanding accountability in some form of justice for torture, for disappearances and for the dead. Families desperate for answers have flooded the interim government with petitions, their pleas gaining urgency as mass graves are uncovered from the rubble of Assad’s rule

One of his first acts has been targeting the Assad-era Counter-Terrorism Court, which was a judicial black hole where thousands of Syrians – whether protesters, dissidents or bystanders – were sentenced in secret, often in absentia, and their fates sealed without appeal. The Counter-Terrorism Court, established in 2012 under Law No 22, was designed less for justice and more for stamping out the revolution. Its legacy haunts countless families. The transitional authorities say that it must end now. Officials have vowed to overturn its verdicts, compensate victims and return stolen property as a result of its rulings.

Federica D'Alessandra, Co-Chair of the IBA Rule of Law Forum, says transitional justice in post-conflict Syria is a complex process requiring a comprehensive approach that prioritises victim participation, balances accountability with stability and integrates international support with domestic institutions. ‘The emphasis here is on genuine proceedings, not acts of vengeful retaliation or show trials, which would only undermine the legitimacy of the new government,’ she says.

D'Alessandra notes that Syria’s unprecedented documentation of wartime atrocities offers a foundation for hybrid justice models, blending truth commissions, amnesties for lower-level offenders and targeted prosecutions of high-responsibility figures.

‘Judicial accountability [must] not be limited to former regime officials [...] adjudicated on the basis of conduct regardless of their affiliation,’ she says. ‘Hybrid models [...] allow Syrians themselves to drive the transition while soothing anxieties about potential abuses of both power and process.’

International assistance

At the same time, international legal efforts are gaining traction. The newly installed government has thrown its support behind international war crimes investigations aimed at the former regime, urging foreign governments and international institutions to assist.

International experts agree. Mark Ellis, the IBA’s Executive Director, says international legal norms, particularly those against impunity for atrocity crimes, should guide Syria’s path, with support from institutions like the UN’s International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, regional human rights courts and the IBA itself.

‘The United Nations is the best source for defining what constitutes a credible transitional justice process’, says Ellis, adding that UN remedy principles mandate five pillars for human rights violations under international law: truth, justice, reparations, reform and prevention. ‘The IBA recognises that post-conflict contexts often demand a strategic sequencing of these measures. Early steps should include preserving evidence, initiating truth-seeking processes and delivering symbolic or emergency reparations.’

Ellis, however, sounds a note of caution for Syria's burgeoning justice efforts. ‘Syria must avoid the tokenism and delay seen in Sri Lanka, as well as the impunity and transitional fragility experienced in Sudan, and instead strive for a victim-centred, legally grounded and politically supported process as modelled in Colombia,’ he says.

Some Syrians are already taking steps in that direction. In 2019, victims filed 1,183 case submissions at the International Criminal Court, targeting President Bashar al-Assad and 17 senior officials. At home, Syria’s Justice Ministry has begun reviewing legal briefs drafted as far back as 2017, aiming to move forward with prosecutions that could lead to reparations not only from Assad’s circle but also from international backers like Iran and Russia.

Meanwhile, the newly created UN-backed Independent Institution on Missing Persons in Syria is searching for answers on the tens of thousands who disappeared. In a rare diplomatic moment unthinkable under Assad, the head of the institution Karla Quintana travelled to Damascus earlier this year and met with dozens of families. For many, it was the first time they could officially document the disappearance of loved ones, some of whom were taken by intelligence forces, others lost in the fog of war.

‘Anything external actors can do to support these measures would be immensely helpful with transitional justice because they lay the groundwork for stability and trust vital to transitional justice,’ says Jose. ‘What is unhelpful is looking away and abandoning Syria again.’

But, inside the country, attention is fast turning inward. Much of it is now focused on Justice Minister al-Wais and the future of the 87 judges who once presided over Syria’s widely feared Counter-Terrorism Court. When al-Wais was photographed shaking hands with Ammar Bilal – a top prosecutor from the Counter-Terrorism Court that al-Wais had just promised to stamp out – public outrage erupted. Syrian journalist Tammam Abulkheir republished the picture mocking the handshake: ‘Real and Historical National Reconciliation.’

‘I personally was one of his victims at the end of 2014,’ Abulkheir wrote of Bilal. ‘He charged me without evidence that I promoted terrorism, demanded the harshest punishment for me, barred me from travel and confiscated my possessions.’

The minister immediately issued a statement: ‘The handshake […] in no way implies leniency towards those who violated Syrian rights and freedoms or towards those who shed Syrian blood.’

Emad Mekay is a freelance journalist and can be contacted at emad.mekay@int-bar.org