President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping during a welcome ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, on 14 May 2026. Official White House photo by Daniel Torok via Flickr

May’s summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping has been criticised for achieving little. While Trump has said the meeting in Beijing was ‘very successful’, the subsequent US briefing about the summit’s outcomes was slightly at odds with the equivalent provided by China. For example, both placed emphasis on different issues and each side referred to agreements that weren’t immediately confirmed by the other country.

Trade was high on the agenda and President Trump was accompanied to Beijing by a delegation of CEOs, representing sectors such as aviation, electric vehicles and AI chips. However, other than China agreeing to buy 200 Boeing aircraft – its first-such commitment since 2017 – there were few trade breakthroughs or significant business deals announced.

Bonnie Glaser, Director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC, says it was clear that the process leading to the summit was very different from what’s usual where US administrations are involved. ‘Trump simply wanted to have conversations with Xi about the issues he cared about, which included Iran, North Korea and Ukraine, the trade relationship, and Chinese export controls – because the US continues to be worried about the lack of smooth delivery of some critical minerals and rare earths,’ she says. ‘Trump didn’t believe that preparation was necessary. He just wanted to lead and guide the conversation with Xi in a way that he thought would produce the outcomes that he needs.’

According to the US fact sheet, China confirmed it would address American concerns regarding supply chain shortages related to rare earths and other critical minerals. Beijing will also review its prohibitions or restrictions on the sale of rare earth production and processing equipment and technologies.

With more detailed preparations, the US could perhaps have secured other Chinese commitments, for example, regarding purchases of soybeans. The US says China will buy at least $17bn per year of American agricultural products in 2026 (pro-rated), 2027 and 2028, in addition to the soybean purchase commitments it made in 2025. But this hasn’t been confirmed by Beijing.

C V Chen, Senior Partner at Lee and Li Attorneys-at-Law in Taipei, says that ‘while the visible results may have been limited, the summit also reflected a more cautious approach by the US in dealing with issues relating to Mainland China. Unlike in earlier decades, when the US often acted from a position of overwhelming dominance, today’s international environment is far more complex.’

Chen highlights the difficulties for President Trump in being seen to make concessions to Beijing, as well as China’s growing influence in global affairs resulting from its economic growth, expanding military capabilities and active participation in multilateral institutions.

‘Neither Washington nor Beijing can simply dictate outcomes to the other,’ he says. ‘The relationship between the US and China is increasingly defined by a mixture of competition, cooperation and mutual dependence. Under such circumstances, it is naturally more difficult for officials […] to arrive at significant pre-negotiated outcomes.’

This greater parity may explain some of Xi’s language during the summit. Amid growing tensions between the rival superpowers on issues from trade to AI, President Xi asked whether China and the US could create a new ‘paradigm’ of major-country relations, overcoming the so-called ‘Thucydides Trap’.

The summit wasn’t the first time President Xi has referenced the ‘Trap’ – a theory describing the inevitability of conflict when a rising power challenges an existing one. However, on social media afterwards, President Trump said Xi had ‘very elegantly referred to the United States as perhaps being a declining nation.’ However, Trump added that while this was true two years ago, the US is now the world’s ‘hottest Nation.’

President Xi also highlighted that Taiwan is the most important issue in China-US relations. ‘If mishandled, the two nations could collide or even come into conflict,’ he said. Beijing claims Taiwan as part of China, but the self-governing island views itself as distinct.

‘Xi wants Trump to understand that this is something that has to be carefully managed,’ says Glaser. ‘He certainly wants to convince Trump to delay, reduce or maybe even stop for a period US arms sales to Taiwan.’

The latest US arms sale to Taiwan – valued at $14bn – has been discussed but not yet approved. Glaser estimates that approval ‘will be delayed until after Xi visits Washington, DC in September, but it will not be postponed for very long.’

The US is obliged, under its 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, to offer the island weapons and services it can utilise to defend itself. And President Trump has insisted since the summit that US policy towards Taiwan hasn’t changed.

However, he has also said he’s ‘not looking to have somebody go independent,’ in reference to Taiwan – following which Taipei issued a statement highlighting its sovereignty but noting it would maintain the status quo with China. Remarks such as these have been interpreted by some as signifying that President Trump has adopted many of the perspectives on Taiwan that Xi may have conveyed to him during the summit. Further, some observers have concluded that Xi’s success in convincing Trump to accept a ‘constructive strategic stability’ framework for US-China relations was a deliberate attempt to link the Taiwan issue with the broader economic and geopolitical relationship with Washington.

‘It is scary for Taiwan but there seems to be a division by geographic sphere of influence and Taiwan is on the wrong side of the divide,’ says Albrecht. ‘There are two great powers, and they appear to be dividing up the world between them.’

‘The two sides both prefer a stable relationship, but on their preferred terms,’ says Glaser. ‘In my view, China’s concept of stability includes the idea that neither country will challenge the other’s core interests,’ with Taiwan being top priority for Beijing. She adds that Beijing probably hopes to use this new framework to constrain the US from taking actions on or with Taiwan that China views as a threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity.