Sergio R Karas^[1]
Karas Immigration Law Professional Corporation, Toronto
karas@karas.ca

Kimiya Asadi^[2]
Karas Immigration Law Professional Corporation, Toronto

Technological tools have become increasingly integrated into the administration of Canada’s immigration system. In high-volume temporary residence, study permit and work permit processing, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) has used tools such as ‘Chinook’ to help officers review application information, organise files and prepare reasons more efficiently.^[3]

With the growing reliance on Chinook and similar technologies, courts have had to confront whether decisions produced with technological assistance continue to meet the administrative and procedural requirements of justification, transparency, intelligibility and fairness. In the post-Vavilov framework, reasonableness reviews require a decision to be justified, transparent and intelligible, while procedural fairness remains concerned with whether the process was fair in all the circumstances.^[4]

It is important to be precise about Chinook. Although it is often discussed alongside artificial intelligence (AI) and automated decision-making, IRCC has described Chinook as a Microsoft Excel-based tool that displays information stored in the Global Case Management System (GCMS) in a more user-friendly way.^[5] According to IRCC, Chinook does not use AI or advanced analytics for decision-making, does not contain built-in decision-making algorithms and does not make or recommend decisions on applications.^[6] In this context, Chinook might be better understood as an Automated Decision Support (ADS) tool rather than a fully automated decision-maker.

A key early decision is Haghshenas v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration). There, the applicant argued that his work permit refusal had been reached with the assistance of AI through Chinook.^[7] Justice Brown rejected the argument on the record before the Court. The evidence showed that the decision was made by a visa officer, not by software.^[8] The Court held that whether a decision is reasonable or unreasonable does not turn on whether AI was used. Judicial review remains focused on the record, the decision and whether the decision satisfies the ordinary requirements of reasonableness.^[9]

That conclusion has limits. Haghshenas does not stand for the proposition that technological assistance is immune from scrutiny. It confirms only that a generalised objection to Chinook is not enough. A party challenging the use of technology must connect the tool to a concrete reviewable error, such as a failure to consider material evidence, inadequate reasons or a procedurally unfair process.

That point was reinforced in Raja v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration). The applicant argued that Chinook undermined the fairness of the officer’s assessment because the tool could extract information from GCMS and generate notes more quickly than a traditional review process.^[10] The Court rejected the argument because the applicant did not provide evidence that Chinook caused the omission of a key consideration or deprived him of the right to have his case heard.^[11] Justice Ahmed also noted that Chinook is not intended to process evidence, assess evidence or make decisions on applications.^[12] The case confirms that courts will not set aside immigration decisions based on speculation about a processing tool. The applicant must show how the tool affected the decision in the case before the court.

The more difficult cases arise where Chinook-assisted processing appears to coincide with reasons suggesting that the officer did not meaningfully engage with the substance of the application. In Safarian v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) the Court considered a study permit refusal where the officer’s notes consisted largely of boilerplate language that appeared to be generated by Chinook.^[13] Justice Grammond emphasised that boilerplate language is not automatically improper.

However, the reviewing court must still be satisfied that the decision-maker turned their mind to the facts of the case and that the court can understand why the decision-maker reached the conclusion.^[14] On the facts of Safarian, the reasons were found to be illogical and the decision was set aside.^[15]

The same concern appeared in Khosravi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration). There, the applicant explained her study plan and career transition in some detail, but the officer’s reasons did not meaningfully respond to that explanation.^[16] The Court held that the decision showed inadequate consideration of the applicant’s submissions, particularly her study plan.^[17] Justice Grammond noted that the application had been processed with the assistance of Chinook 3+ but did not find that Chinook necessarily caused the error.^[18] The important takeaway is that the use of assisted decision-making tools does not relieve officers from the duty to fully consider an application. If the use of such a tool gives the officer a truncated view of the application, the resulting decision may be unreasonable.^[19]

The Federal Court returned to these issues in Mehrara v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration). The applicants challenged a study permit refusal and an associated temporary resident visa refusal that had been processed with the assistance of Chinook.^[20] Justice Battista described Chinook as assistive processing technology and noted that the applicants raised concerns about fettering, procedural fairness and limited information about Chinook’s role in the process.^[21] The Court set aside the decision because the officer’s reasons did not adequately respond to the applicant’s detailed evidence. In particular, the officer doubted the logic of the applicant’s study and career plan despite evidence explaining why the proposed program related to her prior education, work experience and business plans.^[22] The officer was required to explain why the conclusion about the applicant’s career and study plan was preferred over the detailed evidence submitted.^[23]

However, Mehrara is also important for what it did not decide. The Court did not find that Chinook fettered the officer’s discretion. It did not find a breach of procedural fairness merely because Chinook was used. It also did not find a sufficient connection, on the facts of that case, between Chinook’s involvement and the officer’s error.^[24] The error remained an ordinary administrative law error: the reasons did not justify the result in relation to the evidence.

At the same time, Mehrara leaves open important transparency concerns. The Court accepted that Chinook-generated material was not required for effective judicial review on the facts before it, because the essential issue was the mismatch between the evidence and the reasons.^[25] However, the Court cautioned that the systematic deletion of material generated by processing technology may not reflect best practice, particularly where risk indicators are present.^[26] That observation matters because meaningful judicial review depends on the ability to understand the basis on which public power was exercised.

Taken together, these cases show a cautious and conventional judicial approach. The Federal Court has not prohibited IRCC from using assistive technology in immigration processing. Nor has it held that the use of Chinook, by itself, makes a decision unfair or unreasonable. The Court’s focus remains on the decision actually made, the reasons given, and the evidence in the record.

The practical lesson is that technology may assist officers in organising information, managing large caseloads and preparing reasons. But it cannot replace the officer’s obligation to consider the application, engage with central evidence and provide reasons that justify the outcome. For now, the Court’s message is clear: technological tools may support immigration decision-making and litigation, but they do not decide cases, cure inadequate reasons or shield officers and counsel from the basic obligations imposed by law.

Notes