EU Space Act: council negotiations highlight growing de-bate on the scope of harmonisation

Grace Nacimiento
GvW Graf von, Düsseldorf
g.nacimiento@gvw.com

On 25 June 2025, the European Commission published its proposal for a Regulation on the Safety, Resilience and Sustainability of Space Activities in the Union (the ‘EU Space Act’). The proposal seeks to establish the first comprehensive EU-wide regulatory framework for space activities by introducing harmonised requirements on safety, cybersecurity and resilience and the long-term sustainability of space operations, while reducing regulatory fragmentation across Member States.

The proposal is currently progressing through the ordinary legislative procedure. While the European Parliament has yet to adopt its first-reading position, discussions among the Member States have advanced significantly within the Council. The first substantive indication of the Council's approach emerged with the compromise text circulated by the Danish Presidency in December 2025. This was followed by a revised compromise text issued under the Cyprus Presidency in March 2026, which further developed a number of issues raised during the initial negotiations.

Although neither text represents a final Council position, the two compromise documents provide valuable insight into the direction in which the Council is moving. They suggest that Member States broadly support the objective of establishing a common European framework for space activities, while at the same time seeking to limit unnecessary regulatory burdens, preserve national competences in sensitive areas and ensure that the future regime remains proportionate and workable in practice.

What emerges from both compromise texts is not a challenge to the overall objective of the EU Space Act, which is to ensure the safety and security of space and to promote the peaceful uses of space. Rather, the debate has increasingly focused on the appropriate balance between harmonisation at Union level and the preservation of national competences. While the three core pillars of the proposal – Safety, Resilience and Sustainability – remain broadly supported, many Member States have advocated a more pragmatic and flexible regulatory model than originally proposed by the Commission.

One of the most significant areas of discussion concerns the relationship between the proposed regulation and national security. Several Member States have expressed reservations that certain provisions could extend into areas traditionally regarded as falling within national competence, particularly where military activities, dual-use systems or broader security interests are concerned. These concerns were already reflected in the Danish Presidency compromise and continue to feature in subsequent Council discussions. The compromise texts seek to clarify the distinction between commercial space activities subject to European Union regulation and activities linked to defence or national security, which should remain primarily within the responsibility of the Member States.

A second recurring subject relates to spaceports and launch infrastructure. While the Commission proposal adopted a rather broad functional approach, several Member States argued that launch facilities are closely connected to national licensing, safety and security frameworks. Both Presidency texts indicate a preference for preserving greater national discretion in this area and limiting the extent to which spaceports would be subject to a harmonised EU regime.

The role of Member States in emergency situations has also been a focus of considerable attention. Council discussions suggest a preference for granting national authorities greater operational autonomy, particularly where rapid access to space-based information or crisis response measures may be required. This reflects a broader tendency throughout the negotiations to avoid excessive centralisation of operational decision-making at the Union level.

Cybersecurity and resilience requirements have likewise been subject to extensive scrutiny. Many delegations and industry stakeholders raised concerns that parts of the proposed resilience framework could overlap with existing EU legislation, particularly the Network and Information Security Directive 2 (NIS2) Directive. Both the Danish and Cyprus Presidency texts reflect efforts to align the proposed obligations more closely with existing cybersecurity frameworks and to reduce the risk of duplicative compliance requirements for operators. This aspect of the negotiations is particularly noteworthy given the increasing strategic importance of cybersecurity for space infrastructure and services.

Questions of governance have proven equally sensitive. The Commission proposal envisaged a substantial role for the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA), supported by new supervisory and review mechanisms. However, several Member States have expressed reservations regarding the degree of centralised oversight envisaged by the proposal. The evolution of the compromise texts suggests a preference for governance arrangements that preserve a stronger role for national authorities and more clearly delineate responsibilities between national and EU-level bodies.

Beyond these specific issues, Council negotiations have also highlighted more fundamental questions regarding the scope of harmonisation itself. While there appears to be broad support for reducing regulatory fragmentation and improving legal certainty across the European space sector, some Member States have questioned whether a fully harmonised approach is necessary or appropriate in every area covered by the proposal. These concerns are particularly evident in areas where national regulatory frameworks are already well established and where Member States consider existing national systems to function effectively.

This broader debate is perhaps the most interesting development to emerge from the Council negotiations. The progression from the Danish Presidency compromise text to the Cyprus Presidency text suggests that discussions are no longer limited to the design of individual compliance obligations. Increasingly, they touch upon a more fundamental question: how far European harmonisation in the field of space regulation should extend, and where the appropriate boundary lies between Union action and national regulatory autonomy.

In parallel, successive compromise texts have sought to simplify and streamline the proposal. Numerous drafting amendments have been introduced to improve legal certainty, clarify definitions, eliminate ambiguities and make the regulation more accessible for both regulators and operators. Although many of these changes are technical in nature, they reflect a consistent effort by Member States to ensure that the future framework remains workable and proportionate in practice.

Taken together, the Council negotiations suggest that the final shape of the EU Space Act may differ in important respects from the Commission's original vision. While the objective of establishing a common regulatory framework for space activities remains widely supported, Member States are increasingly focused on ensuring that the future regime respects national competences, avoids unnecessary regulatory burdens and remains closely aligned with existing legal frameworks.

As the legislative process moves forward and the European Parliament develops its position, debates concerning governance, cybersecurity, national security and the appropriate limits of harmonisation are likely to remain at the centre of negotiations. The Danish and Cyprus Presidency compromise texts demonstrate that the future EU Space Act is not only a discussion about the technical regulation of space activities, but also a broader debate about the allocation of regulatory authority between the EU and its Member States in an increasingly strategic sector.