Beatrice Stange
Heuking, Düsseldorf
b.stange@heuking.de

Introduction

The regulatory landscape for large digital platforms in Germany continues to be shaped by section 19a of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen or GWB) and the interplay with the EU’s Digital Markets Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/1925, DMA). The German Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt or FCO) has actively enforced these rules against major digital platforms including Alphabet (Google), Meta (Facebook), Amazon, Apple and Microsoft. The tenth amendment to the GWB, effective from January 2021, introduced section 19a GWB to address the unique dynamics and challenges of digital markets, such as network effects, data advantages and ecosystem strategies that can entrench market power. The provision enables the FCO to intervene swiftly and effectively against anti-competitive practices by undertakings of ‘paramount significance for competition across markets’, even without a formal finding of dominance.

Key differences between section 19a GWB and the DMA

With the DMA fully applicable since May 2023, the FCO and the European Commission have coordinated to avoid duplication and ensure consistency. Both regimes target similar anti-competitive conduct. However, there are some distinctions, as follows:

• Designation and scope: section 19a GWB empowers the FCO to designate undertakings as having ‘paramount significance for competition across markets’ based on qualitative criteria (financial strength, data access, vertical integration, ecosystem control). The DMA centralises enforcement at the EU level, with the European Commission designating ‘gatekeepers’ based on quantitative thresholds and a qualitative assessment.
• Sectoral focus: while section 19a GWB is not sector specific, it has so far only been applied to large digital platforms. The DMA applies to ‘gatekeepers’ providing core platform services, such as online intermediation, search engines, social networking and operating systems.
• Prohibited conduct: section 19a(2) GWB lists prohibited practices, including self-preferencing, impeding competitors, leveraging market power in regard to adjacent markets, refusing interoperability and hindering access to data. The FCO may prohibit such conduct by issuing an administrative order. The DMA imposes a list of ‘dos and don’ts’ on gatekeepers involving similar prohibitions, but which are directly applicable and require compliance within six months of designation.
• Legal hierarchy: section 19a GWB is a national law provision and must not conflict with the DMA, which is directly applicable in all EU Member States and pre-empts national measures that would undermine its objectives. However, the DMA does not preclude the application of national competition law, provided there is no conflict.

Enforcement against major platforms

Since the introduction of section 19a GWB, the FCO has maintained a high level of enforcement activity, focusing on the largest digital platforms in operation. Five major platforms, namely Alphabet (Google), Meta (Facebook), Amazon, Apple and Microsoft, were designated as undertakings of ‘paramount significance for competition across markets’ by September 2024. Only Amazon and Apple challenged their designation, but the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH) confirmed the FCO’s assessment and recognised the need for rapid intervention in digital markets.

The following sections summarise key enforcement actions and legal developments.

Alphabet/Google

In December 2021, the FCO designated Google as an undertaking of ‘paramount significance for competition across markets’. Alphabet’s search engine, Google, holds a market share of over 80 per cent in Germany and operates many other services, such as Google Maps, the Chrome browser, the Android operating system and the Play Store. Alphabet is also a major provider of online advertising services.

Since the designation, the FCO has opened three proceedings under section 19a GWB.

In December 2022, Google abandoned plans to integrate Google News Showcase into the general Google search service after concerns that it could disadvantage competing services and publishers. The FCO noted that it received further complaints against Google regarding adequate remuneration for published content (ancillary copyright fees), but has not examined this in detail.^[1]

In October 2023, Google committed to increasing user control over the combination of personal data across Google’s services and non-Google sources, thereby limiting its data-driven market power.^[2] This aligns with Google’s obligations under the DMA on cross-service data processing.

Since February 2025, Google Automotive Services and the Google Maps Platform are subject to commitments to license services as standalone versions and enable interoperability with third-party services. Content provided by Google Maps may now also be displayed on third-party maps, such as OpenStreetMap.^[3]

Meta (Facebook)

In May 2022, the FCO designated Meta as an undertaking of ‘paramount significance for competition across markets.’ In addition to Facebook, Meta operates Instagram and WhatsApp, and invests in hardware and software related to a ‘metaverse’. Meta thus has access to a large set of user data and is also the largest provider of social media advertising.

In 2019, even before the entry into force of section 19a GWB, the FCO prohibited Facebook from combining user data from different sources without the user’s voluntary consent. The FCO did not deem consent to be voluntary if access to the social network was conditional on the users’ consent to Facebook collecting any kind of user data from third-party sources and combining them with the users’ Facebook accounts. Subsequent proceedings before German courts ultimately led to the denial of Meta’s request to order the suspensive effect of its appeal. In addition, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) confirmed that the FCO can also apply data protection rules (the provisions set out in the General Data Protection Regulation or GDPR) when weighing interests in decisions concerning competition law.^[4] The FCO considered Meta’s parallel introduction of an accounts centre and adjustments to its data infrastructure^[5] to be a sufficiently effective package to close the case. Meta withdrew its appeal, making the FCO’s decision final.^[6]

In 2021, Meta changed its policies to allow the use of Meta Quest 2 virtual reality headsets (formerly Oculus) without a Facebook or Instagram account following FCO proceedings.^[7]

Amazon

The FCO designated Amazon as an undertaking of ‘paramount significance for competition across markets’ in July 2022. Inter alia, Amazon acts as a seller, marketplace operator (Amazon Store) and provider of streaming and cloud services (Amazon Web Services). This key player in the e-commerce sector also combines its services to form a digital ecosystem.

The BGH’s confirmation of the FCO’s decision in April 2024 marks the first decision (in the first and final instance) on a complaint against a designation pursuant to section 19a(1) GWB. The key findings by the BGH include:

• there are no constitutional concerns arising from the absence of a further appeal;
• since section 19a(1) GWB is a provision of national competition law, its application is admissible alongside the DMA. The commitments made by Amazon to the European Commission do not preclude the FCO’s declaratory decision; and
• Amazon operates to a considerable extent in multi-sided markets. The decision establishing paramount significance for competition across markets does not require any specific danger to competition or restraint of competition. Rather, it is sufficient that the undertaking has strategic and competition possibilities, the abstract risk potential of which is addressed by section 19a GWB.

Even before Amazon’s designation, the FCO had investigated Amazon’s market behaviour, as follows:

• in 2013, Amazon had agreed to abandon its price parity clause on Amazon Marketplace after the FCO had raised concerns. Under the price parity clause, retailers were required to offer on Amazon the lowest price at which their products were sold through other sales channels, ie, other internet marketplaces and the retailers’ own online shops;^[8] and 
• in 2019, Amazon amended its terms of business in relation to sellers due to the FCO’s investigations, which were initiated following complaints from retailers. Inter alia, Amazon restricted the wide exclusion of its liability, and the broad rights of use retailers had to grant Amazon with regard to their product materials. The clause on the place of jurisdiction, which previously established Luxembourg as the exclusive place of jurisdiction, was also changed.^[9] 

In November 2022, the FCO extended two proceedings to include section 19a GWB, as follows:^[10]

• in June 2025, the FCO issued its preliminary assessment of Amazon’s price control mechanisms, which use algorithms to review and potentially restrict sellers’ prices. If these mechanisms determine that the prices are too high, such offers are removed from the marketplace or not properly displayed.^[11] The FCO is concerned that Amazon’s dual role as retailer and marketplace operator, combined with non-transparent rules, may restrict third-party sellers’ freedom to set their own prices; and 
• the FCO is also examining whether agreements with brand manufacturers that allow or exclude individual retailers from selling brand products on Amazon Marketplace (‘brand gating’) disadvantage third-party sellers.^[12]

Apple

The FCO designated Apple as an undertaking of ‘paramount significance for competition across markets’ in April 2023. Apple’s digital ecosystem is based on its mobile end devices, such as the iPhone, in combination with proprietary products, such as iOS and the App Store. Apple covers the entire value chain for mobile digital end devices, and also develops the software, enabling it to tie users to its ecosystem on a long-term basis and set rules for third parties, especially app developers.

In March 2025, the BGH confirmed Apple’s designation by the FCO. The key findings by the BGH include:

• Apple is active in multi-sided markets, since it acts as an intermediary between device users and app developers. For the application of section 19a (1) GWB, it is sufficient to operate a platform, but it is not necessary to additionally act in a dual role and compete with other users of the platform;
• Section 19a(1) GWB does not require a specific and sufficiently concrete danger to competition or actual restraint of competition. Rather, it is sufficient to assess the competitive possibilities of the undertaking (ie, its market position and resources). In its overall assessment, the FCO must also consider the significance of the individual criteria of section19a(1) GWB for competition and opportunities for cross-market expansion; and
• the application of section 19a(1) GWB is not precluded by the designation of Apple as a gatekeeper and its services, App Store, iOS and Safari, as central platform services under the DMA. There was no evidence that compliance with the respective obligations had materially changed Apple’s position.

In February 2025, the FCO issued a preliminary assessment that Apple’s tracking rules for third-party apps may be prohibited under section 19a(2) GWB and Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). The FCO suspects that these rules favour Apple’s own offerings and impede competing app providers in Apple’s iOS App Store, since explicit consent from users must only be obtained before gaining access to certain data for advertising purposes.

Microsoft

In September 2024, the FCO designated Microsoft as an undertaking of ‘paramount significance for competition across markets’. Microsoft’s strong position in regard to operating systems (Windows), office applications (Office), cloud services (Azure and OneDrive), video conferencing (Teams), gaming (Xbox), professional networking (LinkedIn) and search (Bing) underpin its designation. More recently, Microsoft has started integrating artificial intelligence (AI) applications and partnering with OpenAI (ChatGPT).