Jun 10, 2025
The European Commission has commenced State aid investigations into multinationals’ tax arrangements, including in respect of Apple, Fiat, Starbucks and Amazon. Developments during the past ten years have been seismic, the debates have been fierce and press coverage has been unparalleled. There are both legal and non-legal reasons for this. The main non-legal reasons are the involvement of high-profile multinational companies as alleged aid beneficiaries, the ensuing diplomatic spat between the EU and the US over the alleged ‘targeting’ of US companies and the nexus between the investigations and the EU’s fight against corporate tax avoidance. The main legal reasons are explored in this article. In this article it is asserted that the Commission has overreached and exceeded its mandate by advancing novel legal theories in relation to EU State aid law. More specifically, it has endeavoured effectively to circumvent the unanimity requirement in adopting EU tax legislation by using its exclusive competence in State aid matters to push Member States into adopting OECD taxation standards. The author seeks to demonstrate that, despite some setbacks, the pendulum seems to be swinging towards more deference towards Member States’ tax autonomy in areas where there is no harmonised EU law, and that this is a positive development for two reasons. First, in terms of legal certainty, it provides closure in a series of ‘open’ matters. Second, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has sought to strike the right balance between exclusive EU competence (State aid law) and Member States’ tax sovereignty. Through the analysis that follows, the article will endeavour to shed light on a number of questions, as seen through the case law. First, what are the limits to the EU getting involved in national tax policy? Is it legitimate to circumvent those jurisdictional restrictions through the use of State aid policy? Second, what was the logic of the Commission’s approach and what were its weaknesses? Third, did the CJEU fully accept the Commission’s approach? The structure is as follows. The first part will provide some State aid background for those who are not familiar with EU State aid law and recent seminal cases. The second part analyses what the case law means for Member States’ tax sovereignty, while the third part concludes.