For a long time, price effects have been the focus of merger review procedures in many jurisdictions – newly established and more mature systems alike. The yardstick by which to measure transactions has consistently been whether a transaction will result in customers paying more for the same products. Recent enforcement action seems to suggest a shift in focus: non-price effects are becoming more relevant for purposes of the assessment. Authorities realise that, in a world that is heavily driven by innovation – be it in computer software or raw material exploration services – the effect that consolidation may have on the development of new ideas for products and services may be just as relevant for consumer welfare as the development of prices of such services. This adds a significant dimension to the analysis, challenging merging parties, their advisers and third parties, as well as antitrust enforcers to come up with theories of harm (or justifications for their transactions) that appropriately describe the effects of such deals on competition in a modern world. Is this a trend that we are likely to see more of as the political landscape seems to shift in many places?