Conference programme

This session examines the accountability questions raised by the growing use of AI tools in arbitral proceedings, by counsel, arbitrators and institutions alike. Under the EU AI Act, AI systems used to assist an arbitral tribunal in interpreting the facts and the law are classified as high-risk (Annex III); counsel’s and institutions’ own use of AI generally is not. The timeline for those high-risk obligations is a live issue: originally due to apply from 2 August 2026, they have been deferred to 2 December 2027 under the ‘Digital Omnibus’ package adopted in mid-2026, even as the Act’s AI-transparency duties still take effect on 2 August 2026. The panel will consider who bears responsibility when an AI-generated work product contains errors, what disclosure obligations counsel and arbitrators should have when relying on AI, whether arbitrators may delegate any part of their reasoning process to AI tools and how practitioners should navigate the new regulatory framework in cross-border proceedings.

This Oxford Union-style debate will consider two motions. For each motion, one panellist will argue in favour and another against.

The first motion will be: ‘This house believes that leading arbitral institutions should establish a shared cross-institutional disciplinary mechanism for arbitrators.’ 

International arbitration’s ethical framework rests primarily on soft-law instruments — guidelines, codes of conduct and reputational sanction. However, influence is not enforcement, and a regime that depends on reputation invites the opacity it purports to cure. This motion puts to the vote whether leading institutions should go further and establish a shared mechanism with reciprocal recognition of disciplinary outcomes for serious breaches, such as undisclosed conflicts, discovery abuse or conduct undermining the integrity of proceedings, administered by an independent panel and binding across platforms.

The second motion will be: ‘This house believes that arbitral institutions should impose mandatory enforceable time limits for the rendering of final awards.’

Delay in the delivery of awards is one of the most persistent and widely documented failures in international arbitration. Soft targets (for example, the ICC’s six-month guideline) are routinely missed, and users consistently flag time-to-award as a top concern. This motion asks whether institutions should go beyond exhortation and impose binding deadlines with real consequences for non-compliance. Expect issues such as the impact on user confidence, the risk that rigid deadlines compromise deliberative quality and due process, party conduct in delay and institutional resource constraints to be discussed.